The general use of subjective probabilities to model belief has bee n justified using many axiomatic schemes. For example, 'consistent betting behavior' arguments are well-known. To those not already convinced of the unique fitness and generality of probability models. such justifications are often unconvincing.
betting context is avoided. The gap between qualitative probability and probability proper can be bridged by any of several additional assumptions. The discussion here relies on results common in the recent AI literature, introducing a sixth simple assum ption. The narrative em p hasizes models based on unique complete orderings, but the rationale extends easily to motivate set-valued representations of partial orderings as well.
I INTRODUCilON
Many probabilists assert that subjective probabilities provide a generally useful foundation for the modeling of beliefs in all situations. That is, belief strengths are (or ought to be) realisticall y depicted as probability distributions. and that the strengths change in the face of evidence according to Bayes'
formula.
Non-probabilists naturally take issu e, some denying not only the generality of probability, but the generality of aJIY single formalism (e.g. Smets 1991).
Since there seems to be no controversy that probability models are sometimes useful. a natural question is where the frontiers of their usefulness might lie. In all these assu mptions, the inequality symbols and the 'given stroke' are defined in the usual ways.
(Throughout, we shall consider the conditioning operation as invalid for 'given' sentences ordered equally with F). As stated, these assum ptions lead to a discussion of belief models based upon a single belief ordering. In a later section, we shall modify these assum ptions to support sets of orderings in the interest of motivating set-valued probability models.
The fourth ass umption can be motivated as a kind of dominance principle, specialized here to the belief context rather than to the gambling context (but still within the spirit of Savage, 1972) . The force of the argument is that since we believe that a is no less credible than b if c is true, and believe the same if c is false, and those are the only two possibilities, then our prior ordering should favor a over b.
The flfth assumption was taken from DeGroot (1970) .
In addition to the use we shall make of it here, AS (2) Similarly, by the strict inequality portion of A4, if r (a or c) = r (b or c), then r (a or c I -c) cannot be strictly greater nor strictly less than r (b or c 1 "1:), and so by AS again, we concluder (a) = r (b).
(1) and (2) are the 'only if' portion; the contrapositive of(l) is the 'ir portion. II
The usual definition of qualitativr: probability comprises Al, A2, A3, and the theorem. Thus, we conclude that ordering r ()is a qualitative probability.
We now seek conditions under which there exists some probability distribution p ( ) which agrees with r ( ), that is, for all sentences a, b in the ordering. r (a)>= r (b) if and only ifp (a)>= p (b).
3 Fll OM QUALITATIVE TO ORDINARY PR O BABILITY Fishburn and Roberts (1989) review some of the literature on the additional assu mptions needed for a qualitative probability on a futite domain to have an agreein g probability distribution. If there are four or fewer mutuall y exclusive and collectively exhaustive propositions of interest, then an agreein g probability distribution exists without further assu mptions (Kraft et al., I959) . For practical work., of course, something more general is needed.
For an AI audience, it may be interesting to look at the qu�on in light of the results of Horvitz, et aJ. (1986) , which results are well-known in the AI literature. These authors showed that if a scalar measure suffices to represent the degree of belief (and an index on the fi nite ordering satisfies that), then the scalar is an increasing transformation of some probability distribution provided that, in our notation:
HI. for all sentences a and b, when the other is held constant.
Assumption HI, sometimes called complemeJJtarity, has bee n criticized on intuitive grounds by Dubois and Prade (1988) . It is, however, proven that every qualitative probability exhibits C()mplementarity (Kraft, et al., 1959) .
Assumption H2, despite its relative complexity, is often presented as intuitively reasonable in its own right. However, Dubois and Prade (1990) have noted that if H2 is amended to read weakly increasing instead of stricdy increasing. then the necessi ty of probability measures doesn't follow from H 1 and the amended H2. This observation has great force if weakly increasing relationships serve the intuition underlying H2 as well as strictly increasing relationships do.
There is no way to resolve a clash of intuitions, but it may be helpful to derive H2 from other, simpler assum ptions. That way, at least, further discussion is narrowed. We proceed by introducing a new ass umption to the five already made, a specialized "chain rule": A6. For all sentences x, y, and z in the ordering such that x implies y and y implies z, r (x 1 z) is a strictly increasing function of r (x I y) and of r (y 1 z) when the other is held constant.
We then note the following corollary of assum ption A5:
r (b I a) = r (b and a 1 a )
Apart from its logical status, the corollary makes sense: if we learned that a was true, then our opinion about b would presumably coincide with our opinion about the conjunction of b and the now-known-to-be-true a. From these we offer the following proof of H2: Thus, the present assum ptions Al through A6 imply Horvitz et al.'s HI and H2, leading to the conclusion that there is at least one ordinary probability distribution which agrees with the ordering r ( ).
ANO TEON SET-VALUED MODELS
While many fmd the notion of ordered belief intuitively plausible, many also fmd the notion of a complete ordering implausible. On computational grounds, there are a lot of beliefs to order. Further there is no room for modesty in a complete ordering; perhaps the believer simply doesn't know enough to rank confidently the sentence 'it will rain tomorrow in Boston' against 'traffi c will be heavy in Boston tomorrow nittht.' Indeed, a frequently-heard rejoinder to the pignic motivation of probability (and others which insist that only a single probability distribution will do) is that complete orderings are often psycholopically unrealistic and prattmaticall y burdensome.
Only simple modifications of the earlier arguments are needed to support set-valued probability models of partially ordered beliefs. A convenient starting point for such a model is the set of all belief orderings not ruled out by either the beliefs actually held or by the 3SSU mptions AI through A5.
Each member of the set would be a qualitative probability. If A6 (or any of the other 'bridging' assum ptions studied in the literature) holds, then each member would be an increasing transform of one or more probability distributions. The fmal model would be the set of all probability distributions which agree with at least one ordering in the set of qualitative probabilities. Beliefs would be modeled by this arrangement in the sense of unanimous agreem ent,
Such a model satisfies a simple generalization of the minimum plausible requirements for bel ief models identified by Prade (1985) , namely
since all probability distributions, and hence each distribution in the model set, display these properties. Of course, the distributions would not always agree on particular values for p (a) and p (b), although they would agree on the inequality; hence the need to somewhat generalize Prade's criteria.
S CONCLUSIONS
There is no possibility that the enumeration of any set of axioms will confound the non-believers. nor is it necessa ry to the su<X:eSS of the probabilist program that other scholars quietly leave the field. On the contrary, the criticisms of Zadeh, Dempster and Shafer, and many others of like mind spur the development and evolution of probabilist ideas.
Probabilists who favor set-valued models, for instance, owe a debt to these non-probabilists for their critique of the pignic approach to belief modelling. Let us fmish by returning to the question of where the frontiers of probabilism's usefulness might lie, first raised in the introduction. The gist of the axioms presented here is that probability models are appropriate whenever (1) the believer subscribes to certmn constraints about how sentences may be ordered in 'belief-worthiness ', (2) the believer subscribes to certain constraints about how such an ordering would change if evidence were observed, and (3) the objective of the model is to represent the orderings that are subject to these constraints and to constraints imposed by the actual beliefs themselves.
No claim is made that the constraints of (1) and (2) 
